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Dewey’s Reflective Thought 
Bill O’Brien 
The purpose of  this paper is to critically examine abstraction in the context of  John 
Dewey’s notion of  reflective thought. Abstraction is to be understood as a pragmatic 
tool that underpins reflective thought. In other words, reflective thought—that is, 
the capacity to think of  practical solutions to problems we confront in our lives,—
needs to use the tool of  pragmatic abstraction. In the context of  reflective thought, I 
explore and explain how pragmatic abstraction is used. Here, I take issue with how 
pragmatic abstraction is used as merely a means to bring about ‘successful’ 
consequences to a problem. This use of  pragmatic abstraction fails to consider the 
critical question of  whose success is being brought about. Due to this, ‘successful’ 
consequences to a problem can result for some, while negative consequences to the 
same problem can result for others. The ‘reasonable woman standard’ that developed 
in the law illustrates a concrete example of  this problematic split and a legal effort to 
resolve it. Ultimately, by reconsidering how reflective thought uses the tool of  
pragmatic abstraction, “successful” consequences to problems are brought about in a 
more inclusive manner. 
I. Introduction 
In this paper, I critically examine the tool of  abstraction, specifically within the realm of  
John Dewey’s notion of  reflective thought. Our human capacity to utilize the tool of  abstraction is 
fundamental, essential, and sometimes problematic in our practical lives. We must reconsider our use 
of  abstraction (specifically pragmatic abstraction) in the context of  Dewey’s reflective thought, such 
that we can both improve the tool’s utility in our lives, and also ameliorate—possibly even eliminate
—the inconsiderate practical results of  its past use.  
To build up to the critical examination, I will begin the paper by qualifying abstraction as 
pragmatic abstraction, drawing on John Dewey’s definition of  abstraction in his work Reconstruction in 
Philosophy. Next, I will elucidate the context I will be critically examining the tool of  pragmatic 
abstraction in: John Dewey’s notion of  reflective thought in his work How We Think. First, I will 
explain reflective thought’s process, that is, how reflective thought functions. Following this, I will 
explain reflective thought’s purpose, that is, what it functions for. This detailed understanding of  our 
context completed, I will build up to critically examining pragmatic abstraction within it. First, I will 
examine how pragmatic abstraction functions within reflective thought (i.e., its process). Following 
this, I will examine what pragmatic abstraction functions for within reflective thought (i.e., its 
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purpose). Here, I embark upon the principle task of  this paper, as I critically examine pragmatic 
abstraction’s purpose and use within Dewey’s notion of  reflective thought, employing an example in 
law to illustrate some concrete problems that result. From this, I conclude that we should adopt a 
reconsidered notion of  reflective thought (as that which must necessarily consider whose practical 
“success” we are dealing with) because it improves the utility of  pragmatic abstraction as a tool and 
can repair some of  the inconsiderate practical results of  its past use, ultimately rendering it more ‘in 
touch’ with the nuances of  each of  our lives. 
II. Dewey and Pragmatic Abstraction  
In his work Reconstruction in Philosophy, John Dewey explains what he takes abstraction to 
mean, “Looked at functionally, not structurally and statically, abstraction means that something has 
been released from one experience for transfer to another.”  Viewed in this manner, abstraction is a 1
double movement, one that involves both a release from and a transfer to. This is to say that there is a 
release from present experience and a subsequent transfer back to present experience. Understood in 
this qualified way, abstraction is very practical, as it both originates from and discharges back into 
present experience. For the purposes of  this paper, we are understanding abstraction as that which I 
will call pragmatic abstraction.  
At the outset, t is important to dismiss some understandings of  abstraction we will not be 
dealing with in this paper. To this point, merely the initial move (i.e., the release), or just the latter 
move (i.e., the transfer), abstraction has commonly been understood as complete. This one-way 
understanding of  abstraction cannot account for the complete practical and concrete bearing of  
pragmatic abstraction. In fact, this strictly one-way understanding precludes all together a complete 
understanding of  pragmatic abstraction. It is important for us to recognize that this incomplete 
understanding, wherein abstraction is simply the removal of  facts from present experience, or 
merely the appliance of  facts onto present experience (as some rationalists hold), is precisely what 
Dewey is attempting to break through. Although this understanding is not wrong per se, for the 
purposes of  this paper, it is simply not sufficient for completely understanding pragmatic abstraction, 
let alone reflective thought. Given this, we must reject the one-way understanding of  abstraction, 
but keep in mind that it is certainly part of pragmatic abstraction.  
Abstraction now qualified as pragmatic abstraction, we see that we are dealing with a highly 
practical, dual aspect tool. Further, we are engaging a tool that is essential in and for our lives. 
Dewey affirms this, stating, “viewed teleologically or practically, [pragmatic abstraction] represents 
 1. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1926), 150.
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the only way in which one experience can be made of  any value for another.”  In other words, 2
pragmatic abstraction allows us to connect one moment of  our present experience to another. 
Further, Dewey stresses pragmatic abstraction is the only valuable way one experience can be 
connected to another. This renders pragmatic abstraction a necessary and essential tool for 
interpreting and making sense of  one moment of  our lives in light of  another.  
In sum, from an understanding of  abstraction as pragmatic abstraction, and an 
understanding of  pragmatic abstraction as essential in and for our lives, we have a baseline to work 
with when we begin to later examine this tool in the context of  Dewey’s notion of  reflective thought.  
III. Dewey’s Notion of  Reflective Thought  
Much like pragmatic abstraction, reflective thought involves a practical, double (i.e., two-way) 
movement. Further, like pragmatic abstraction, reflective thought is essential in and for our lives. It 
will be seen that a life without engaging reflective thought is not only a life dazed and confused, but 
also an unrealistic and idyllic life. To this point, I will lay out how reflective thought functions. 
Before this though, we can first qualify reflective thought to understand what it is not, this 
will serve to clear the way for understanding what it is. First, some common and overly-broad 
interpretations will be cast away. Dewey quips, “He who offers ‘a penny for your thoughts’ does not 
expect to drive any great bargain.”  This remark is to comically dismiss an understanding of  3
reflective thought as anything and everything that passes through our minds. Reflective thought 
must not be understood this way, as this understanding is too expansive and even borders on being 
vague. Examining reflective thought in this sense would be quite cumbersome and, ultimately, 
unnecessary. To keep with Dewey’s joke, we can say that examining reflective thought in this sense 
would prove too expensive for this paper’s budget.  
This understanding cast off, we must now dismiss another understanding of  reflective 
thought. To this point, reflective thought must not be understood as that which is wholly detached 
from present things. For example, Dewey says that children tell imaginative stories that are not 
necessarily a “faithful record of  observation” of  things in present experience.  Given this, we are 4
not engaged with practical (i.e., observed) things, so there is no “aim at knowledge, at belief  about 
facts or in truths” for Dewey.  We see that reflective thought, alongside knowledge, facts, and truths, 5
must be understood upon the basis of  present things. In sum, reflective thought must not be 
construed as anything and everything that enters our mind, nor must it be understood as a baseless 
 2. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 150.
 3. Dewey, How We Think, 2.
 4. Dewey, How We Think, 3. 
 5. Dewey, How We Think, 3.
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invention of  our imaginative capacities. Now that we understand what reflective thought is not, we 
can more precisely understand what reflective thought is.  
In Dewey’s words, reflective thought is “Active, persistent, and careful consideration of  any belief  or 
supposed form of  knowledge in the light of  the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends.”  6
To elucidate this, we can break it down and begin to examine how this functions. Once its process is 
understood, we will see that reflective thought—though it lacks the consideration of  whose 
“success” that I claim is necessary—is essential in our lives, just like the tool of  pragmatic 
abstraction.  
First, it is paramount to understand that reflective thought must first commence upon a 
“problem.” To this point, Dewey states, “[reflective] thinking takes its departure from specific conflicts 
in experience that occasion perplexity and trouble.”  This is to say that when believed facts, 7
knowledge, or truths are thrown into doubt, we have a “problem” before us. Further, the doubt and 
uncertainty that troubles our believed facts, knowledge, or truths, also obscures how we are to 
operate practically in present experience.  
From this confusion, reflective thought begins operating and is supposed to carefully 
consider a problem in an attempt to resolve it. But what exactly is the threshold for deeming 
something a problem where then reflective thought starts functioning? For Dewey, the threshold is 
minuscule. To understand what constitutes a “problem,” we must be “willing to extend the meaning 
of  the word problem to whatever—no matter how slight and commonplace in character—perplexes 
and challenges the mind so that it makes belief  at all uncertain.”  In other words, we must be willing 8
to understand a problem as anything which stands in the way of  us holding, for all intents and 
purposes, a certain belief. Given the broad definition of  a problem, we can see why a life without 
engaging in reflective thought is pure fantasy. For one, life is anything but absolutely certain. In fact, it 
seems to be certainly uncertain! Simply by virtue of  living, humans are endowed with uncertain 
belief, and therefore, are endowed with problems. This is why reflective thought is so gripping and 
essential as a context to critically examine pragmatic abstraction in. Given any (inevitable) doubt at 
all in a purportedly certain belief, we have a problem which necessitates some degree of  “thinking 
through” to a resolution and this “thinking through” is precisely reflective thought.  
 Next, but usually in tandem alongside a problem, is the first step of  reflective thought. This 
first step is the observation and noting of  present facts that pinpoint (more or less) exactly the 
 6. Dewey, How We Think, 6.
  7. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 139. My emphasis.
  8. Dewey, How We Think, 9.
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problem. This step is fundamentally practical, as it pertains to the facts of  a problem as they 
perplexingly appear directly before us. Regardless of  whether the observation of  present facts is 
bundled alongside the occurrence of  a problem or not, this observational step of  reflective thought 
importantly leads to reflective thought’s suggestion step. Dewey states “The seen thing is regarded as 
in some way the ground or basis of  belief in the suggested thing; it possesses the quality of  evidence.”  In 9
other words, the observed present facts serve as the grounds for reflective thought’s active, 
persistent, and supposedly careful consideration of  what is then suggested. In this way, observed 
facts pertaining to the problem, confused and perplexing as they stand at present, suggest further 
(more or less) pertinent facts for the consideration of  a problem's potential resolution.  
 For example, if  I believe fairly certainly that I try to take precautions to keep my room insect 
free, yet I observe ants crawling on my desk, I have a problem. Applied to these facts, the problem is 
holding, simultaneously, both my insect-free room belief  and my undeniable observation that ants 
are on my desk; the latter perplexes the former belief. Important for potentially resolving the 
problem at hand, this observation suggests further facts for consideration. From this, we can see 
why the suggestion step is so crucial in the process of  reflective thought. If  observed facts did not 
suggest any potential solution to a problem, we are effectively stuck guessing what to do in light of  
the confusing present facts before us. For suggestions, we always need to remember their need for 
further facts to confirm them.  
To keep with the ant example we were positing, suggestions for potentially solving it could 
be along the lines of  ‘attempt removing the old food from my desk they are after’ or ‘attempt 
moving the desk off  of  the ant hill below it’, etc. As previously alluded to, to show the efficacy, 
worth, and “success,” of  these suggestions, we need to test them out in present experience (i.e., 
actually remove the old food from my desk, and so on). In Deweyan terms, we need to consider 
suggestions in light of  their practical application to a problem. Here, we come upon the inquiry step 
of  reflective thought that follows from the suggestion step. As Dewey puts it, this inquiry step 
serves to “confirm or refute the suggested belief ” in present experience.  For inquiry, we look for 10
evidence in present experience to corroborate a suggestion, given that a suggestion is merely itself: a 
possibility until realized. In this way, the inquiry step functions in reflective thought as a practical 
justificatory step for the suggestion step.  
Similar to a problem for Dewey, what counts as justifiable inquiry into a suggestion is 
understood very generally, wherein simple sensory operations suffice. To this end, Dewey gives a 
  9. Dewey, How We Think, 7.
 10. Dewey, How We Think, 10.
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simple example of  feeling a cold breeze that suggests a storm is coming. To test this suggestion, all 
we need to do is look to the sky to see if  there are indeed rain clouds moving our way. If  a problem 
is not so simple and mere sensory functions are not enough, one may call upon relevant facts, 
knowledge, or truths based on prior practically “successful” experiences. Ultimately, we can 
comprehensively understand inquiry as the step in reflective thought that aims to justify what is 
suggested in such a way that this suggestion proves practically useful for solving the problem at 
hand. This step explained, we have completed our journey through how the process of  reflective 
thought functions.  
Overall, we have seen that in the process of  reflective thought there is a double movement 
both from and back into present experience, much like pragmatic abstraction. Much like pragmatic 
abstraction as well, reflective thought has shown itself  to be a very practical endeavor. By later 
examining pragmatic abstraction’s function and purpose within reflective thought, I believe that we 
embark upon an exploration of  a fundamental aspect of  our lives. We have seen that reflective 
thought necessitates its own occurrence in our uncertain lives. Given this, engaging reflective 
thought is unavoidable, and pervasive in many practical encounters. At this point, calling into 
question the necessity of  reflective thought in our lives shifts the burden of  proof  onto the 
objecting party. It is possible that there is someone to take up this objection, but, for better or worse, 
I cannot correspond with the dead or the divine.  
Now, I will now explain reflective thought’s purpose. It is possible to have already anticipated 
reflective thought’s purpose from the trajectory of  its process. Anyhow, Dewey says, “Demand for the 
solution of  a perplexity is the steadying and guiding factor in the entire process of  reflection.”  This 11
is to say that bringing about a “successful” solution to a problem is the central purpose of  engaging 
reflective thought. Understanding this is key to understanding pragmatic abstraction’s purpose in the 
context of  reflective thought, but we will discuss this in a later section.  
Back to the purpose of  reflective thought, Dewey states that “the most striking fact about 
[reflective] thinking as it empirically is—namely, its flagrant exhibition of  cases of  failure and 
success—that is, of  good thinking and bad thinking.”  From this, we see that reflective thought’s 12
striking fact according to Dewey is the fact that it practically exhibits results of  either “success” or 
failure, wherein “success” is a result of  good reflective thinking and failure is the result of  bad 
reflective thinking. “Success,” for Dewey, is defined very broadly and is largely unqualified, wherein 
anything that practically solves a problem is sufficient for being called a “successful” result of  
 11. Dewey, How We Think, 11. Emphasis added. 
 12. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, 136.
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reflective thought. Conversely, failure is simply that which does not meet this sufficient condition for 
being called “successful.” In short, it does not practically solve a problem.  
This striking fact for Dewey emphasizes the inquiry step of  reflective thought, where 
suggestions are empirically confirmed or refuted in light of  how useful they are for solving a 
problem. Ultimately, from reflective thought’s striking fact, we may say that the purpose of  reflective 
thought is embodied in good thinking, as good thinking is that which brings about “successful” 
practical outcomes that solve a problem.  
Interestingly, bad thinking can be educational for good thinking, such that the results of  bad 
thinking can inform future good thinking. Nonetheless, this does not permit us to say that bad 
thinking is equal to good thinking and ultimately equal to reflective thought’s purpose. No, only 
insofar as bad thinking informs subsequent good thinking does it align with reflective thought’s 
ultimate purpose: a practically “successful” resolution to a problem. In this qualified way, reflective 
thought’s purpose can be extended to bad thinking.  
Anyhow, further explaining good thinking will give us a more in-depth understanding of  
reflective thought’s purpose. Good thinking is not only that which “successfully” solves a problem, 
but it is also that which is logical. “The word logical is synonymous with wide-awake, thorough, and 
careful reflection-- thought in its best sense.”  From this, we understand that the term logical is 13
associated with reflective thought in its best form, and this must mean it is associated with good 
thinking (as opposed to bad thinking). Subsequently, the ‘logical’ is associated with bringing about a 
“successful” practical solution to a problem. In Dewey’s words, “Logical . . . is at once . . . vital and 
practical; [‘logical’ is used] to denote, namely, the systematic care, negative and positive, taken to 
safeguard reflection so that it may yield the best results under the given conditions.”  Again, this is to say that 14
what is logical is that which guides reflective thought to a practically “successful” end. In this way, 
logic (and what is logical) takes on a pragmatic character in Dewey’s reflective thought, where it is 
understood in terms of  its practical results, and their subsequent “success” or failure to usefully 
solve a problem. As already mentioned, being logical is associated with reflective thought’s best form 
(i.e., good thinking), and is equal to reflective thought’s overall purpose of  bringing about 
“successful” practical consequences that solve a problem. At this point, we now understand the 
purpose of  reflective thought in detail and how it can be understood as embodied in good thinking, 
and further how good thinking can be understood as that which is logical.  
 13. Dewey, How We Think, 57.
 14. Dewey, How We Think, 57. My emphasis. 
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To be sure, understandings will be dismissed (as we did with reflective thought) that are not 
pertinent to the purposes of  this paper. The term logical is not to be understood as broadly as “any 
thinking that ends in a conclusion,” as this would represent bad thinking and the failure to bring 
about solutions to a problem as logical and good thinking.  This understanding is clearly 15
nonsensical, and therefore must be dismissed. Further, the term logical must not be understood as 
narrowly constrained to what is strictly logical. To this point, Dewey states “Stringency of  proof  is 
here the equivalent of  the logical. In this sense mathematics and formal logic (perhaps as a branch of  
mathematics) alone are strictly logical.”  In this sense, reflective thought, let alone good thinking, could 16
not be understood as logical at all because it is not understood as strictly logical. Given this, this 
understanding of  the term logical must be dismissed. Having a pragmatic definition of  “logical” 
established, we now move on to examining the tool of  pragmatic abstraction within reflective 
thought, keeping in mind reflective thought’s process and purpose. 
IV. Pragmatic Abstraction in Dewey’s Reflective Thought  
I will begin by examining how the tool of  pragmatic abstraction functions within reflective 
thought. How abstraction is involved in each step of  reflective thought will be elucidated through 
understanding reflective thought via two new umbrella terms related to it, namely, inductive 
movement and deductive movement. Let’s begin pragmatic abstraction’s examination in reflective 
thought by exploring reflective thought’s inductive movement. This movement encompasses 
reflective thought’s observation step leading into its suggestion step, and thereby tends “toward 
discovery of  a binding principle,” one which relates to solving the problem at hand.  In terms of  17
pragmatic abstraction, reflective thought’s initial inductive movement is effectively pragmatic 
abstraction’s initial movement. Pragmatic abstraction initially releases from present experience, and in 
terms of  reflective thought, is involved in its movement from present facts to a suggested binding 
principle.  
We will now move into reflective thought’s origin, and begin our examination of  pragmatic 
abstraction from where reflective thought takes its departure from: a problem. A problem is premised 
upon the same foundation for pragmatic abstraction. A problem, as already mentioned, exists as a 
“puzzling phenomenon” in present experience.  To emphasize the importance of  present 18
experience in both processes, we can negatively say that without it, there is no ground or possibility 
for pragmatic abstraction, let alone a concrete problem to reflectively engage. Given this, we see that 
 15. Dewey, How We Think, 56.
 16. Dewey, How We Think, 56. My emphasis. 
 17. Dewey, How We Think, 82.
 18. Dewey, How We Think, 203.
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the grounds of  using the tool of  pragmatic abstraction are fundamentally similar to the grounds of  
reflective thought’s point of  departure. In fact, pragmatic abstraction’s initial movement occurs in 
reflective thought’s move from the present facts of  a problem, to the next step in its inductive 
movement: a suggestion. As Dewey says, “Suggestion . . . involves going from what is present to 
something absent. Hence, it is more or less speculative, adventurous.”  A suggestion is itself  a 19
product of  pragmatic abstraction’s initial ‘letting go’ or ‘release from’ present facts. Therefore, 
because a suggestion comes about via pragmatic abstraction’s initial release from the facts of  present 
experience, a suggestion itself  is said to be absent from all things practical.  
 Already, in the early stages of  reflective thought, we see that pragmatic abstraction is an 
essential feature. If  it did not occur in reflective thought, we would have no outlet for figuring out 
possible solutions to our present problem. Without abstraction, let alone pragmatic abstraction, the 
present facts of  a problem would stay confused. Again, this is because there is nothing about the 
present facts, as such, that directly indicates a possible solution; hence, the problem and the 
importance of  reflective thought’s suggestion step absent present experience.  
Thus far, we have seen how abstraction functions in the inductive movement of  reflective 
thought. Further, we see that the first half  of  reflective thought, as starting from what is present and 
then moving toward the absent, occurs via pragmatic abstraction. Noting this, we move on to 
explore the latter half  of  reflective thought (i.e., its deductive movement) to further trace pragmatic 
abstraction’s process within it. The latter half  of  reflective thought, called the deductive movement, 
is in fact the occurrence of  the second half  pragmatic abstraction, that is, its latter ‘transfer’ 
movement. In terms of  reflective thought, the deductive movement tends toward “testing﹣
confirming, refuting, modifying” suggestions from reflective thought’s inductive movement and acts 
as an “instrument of  inquiry, of  observation and experimentation.”  From this quote, we find that 20
the suggestion step and the final step of  reflective thought (i.e., inquiry) are encompassed in this 
movement. Inquiry, as already mentioned in a previous section, is all about working out and 
practically testing the suggestions that have been conjured up from the initial inductive movement 
of  reflective thought. More specifically, its role is to practically confirm or refute a suggestion’s 
“success” to solve a problem at hand.  
We can now see how pragmatic abstraction’s transfer movement is fundamentally necessary 
for moving from reflective thought’s suggestion step to its inquiry step. Having an understanding of  
how pragmatic abstraction functions within reflective thought, I will now examine what the purpose 
 19. Dewey, How We Think, 75.
  20. Dewey, How We Think, 94.
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of  pragmatic abstraction is in reflective thought, and this will lead to the paper’s principle task: to 
critically examine pragmatic abstraction within reflective thought.  
All our previous examinations and explanations in mind, we turn to what pragmatic 
abstraction’s purpose is within reflective thought. From this examination, we will see that pragmatic 
abstraction’s purpose is effectively the same as reflective thought’s purpose and turns out to be quite 
personal. In the following section, we will examine the problematic results of  this conflation of  
purposes. But first, we know that in order to achieve “successful” practical results from reflective 
thought, we must of  course initially release from the practical. In this, reflective thought moves from 
its practical observation step to its absent suggestion step. After this, reflective thought moves from 
its absent suggestion step to its practical inquiry step. Like its initial inductive movement, reflective 
thought’s following deductive movement is also carried by and reliant on pragmatic abstraction’s 
movement. Though the whole movement of  reflective thought relies upon pragmatic abstraction’s 
complete movement, the purpose of  utilizing pragmatic abstraction in reflective thought is 
ultimately derived from reflective thought’s deductive movement.  
In this movement, pragmatic abstraction’s transfer move is utilized to test an absent 
suggestion’s practical “success” or failure for resolving a problem. This practical inquiry is directly 
aimed at achieving reflective thought’s purpose. In this way, reflective thought’s utilization of  
pragmatic abstraction is ultimately for the purpose of  demonstrating “success” sufficient to solve a 
problem. What exactly constitutes “success” sufficient to solve a problem is largely reliant on the 
individual who works through the problem, and typically varies from person to person. This point is 
important because pragmatic abstraction is itself  indifferent to reflective thought’s practical 
“success” and failure. Pragmatic abstraction in the context of  reflective thought on the other hand, 
is ultimately understood as always being used for bringing about practical “success.” In other words, 
the originally impartial purpose of  pragmatic abstraction, now taken up in Dewey’s reflective 
thought, follows the lead of  reflective thought’s purpose and acts as the grounds that usher 
“successful” practical ends that solve a problem.  
Overall, pragmatic abstraction’s indifferent practical purpose becomes oriented for reflective 
thought’s partial purpose, wherein pragmatic abstraction is used only to provide grounds for good, 
logical, and “successful” reflective thought. As the purpose of  pragmatic abstraction in reflective 
thought, we find two important implications. On the one hand, pragmatic abstraction’s redefined 
purpose is overwhelmingly how we individually encounter our practical environment and pursue 
interests in life. On the other hand, pragmatic abstraction’s redefined purpose changes the use of  a 
practically impartial tool to a use for a practically partial purpose. When reflective thought utilizes 
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this tool, pragmatic abstraction loses its practical indifference to its results and becomes something 
more than just that which releases from and transfers back to present experience. It no longer acts as 
simply that which allows for both “success” and failure in reflective thought, rather, it becomes that 
which is always geared toward one outcome: “success.” As the necessary tool for reflective thought, 
pragmatic abstraction in this context can now be seen to function for practically bringing about our 
own “success.” For solving problems that are not directly related to oneself, the question of  whose 
“success” we are practically seeking when utilizing pragmatic abstraction for reflective thought 
becomes crucial to consider.  
V. Critical Examination of  Pragmatic Abstraction in Dewey’s Reflective Thought 
To begin the critical examination of  pragmatic abstraction in Dewey’s reflective thought, it is 
important to first reiterate that reflective thought fundamentally functions in and for the practical 
realm, specifically in and for our individual practical endeavors. Not recognizing this premise, or 
straying from it, is largely the reason why the use of  pragmatic abstraction for reflective thought 
sometimes proves practically “successful” to some yet problematic to others. Dewey acknowledges 
reflective thought’s individual confines when he states that the phrase “‘Think for yourself ’ is 
tautological; any thinking is thinking for one’s self.”  This is to say that reflective thought, or simply 21
any thought at all, is fundamentally personal, though not necessarily self-interested. It is true that 
many humans may have the same problem, but it is not true that they deal with this problem in the 
exact same way. To this point, individuals may mutually observe a present fact of  a problem yet 
disagree on the significance of  that fact, or individuals may disagree on what suggestion is most 
likely to yield (via subsequent inquiry) a resolution to a problem. This shows again that utilizing the 
tool of  pragmatic abstraction to engage in reflective thought tends toward only one measure of  
“success”, namely, one’s own “success.” Due to this, we now see why extending to others the 
practical “success” of  reflective thought (brought about via pragmatic abstraction) must be carefully 
considered. To this point, I will now dive into an example that illustrates the problematic concrete 
consequences of  ignoring or not being aware of  reflective thought’s individualized use of  pragmatic 
abstraction. 
A Case Study: The “Reasonable Woman” Standard  
This example is one that has played out in the legal realm and is a good indicator of  how the 
tool of  pragmatic abstraction in reflective thought can become less problematically used when it is 
carefully reconsidered. The consideration of  whose “success” practically results from pragmatic 
abstraction’s use within reflective is necessary to take into account. In the field of  law, there is a 
  21. Dewey, How We Think, 198.
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standard that is called the “reasonable woman standard.” This standard has largely come to replace a 
standard called the “reasonable person standard” in cases of  sexual harassment. This replacement 
speaks directly to why necessarily considering whose “success” is of  great practical importance. 
Further, it illustrates how “successful” yet problematic practical consequences can be (and have 
been) avoided. Interestingly, these problematic results are precisely what the reasonable person 
standard sought to eliminate. By designating a reasonable person as a standard, who is qualified only 
to the extent that they are reasonable and human, the law sought a catch-all, non-discriminatory, and 
undifferentiated standard. Although the intent of  this standard seems just and fair, wherein no 
person’s difference(s) will affect their representation in a case, it actually proves to be the problem.  
In sexual harassment cases for example, homogenizing all persons to an undifferentiated 
standard has concretely proven unfair and unjust. This is due to the fact that these cases have to do 
with differences between women and men. Adhering to the reasonable person standard is equivalent to 
not considering whose “success” we are practically seeking when utilizing the tool of  pragmatic 
abstraction for reflective thought. One of  these important differences (that must be considered) may 
be seen in the case of  Lipsett v. University of  Puerto Rico:  
A male supervisor might believe, for example, that it is legitimate for him to tell a 
female subordinate that she has a ‘great figure’ or ‘nice legs.’ The female subordinate, 
however, may find such comments offensive. Such a situation presents a dilemma for 
both the man and the woman: the man may not realize that his comments are 
offensive, and the woman may be fearful of  criticizing her supervisor.   22
The remarks in this case exemplifies a crucial difference between men and women, wherein 
the man thinks his remarks are flattering, but the woman thinks that his remarks are offensive. In an 
issue published by the Fordham Law Review, Robert S. Alder and Ellen R. Peirce evince the 
importance of  recognizing this difference in sexual harassment cases, stating that there “is a body of  
research suggesting that men and women differ in their judgements of  what particular behaviors and 
comments constitute sexual harassment.”  From this, we see that our discussion of  the reasonable 23
person standard and the reasonable woman standard is at its core a discussion about whether to 
consider these differences in judgements. If  we apply the undifferentiated reasonable person 
standard, can this important and concrete difference be accounted for? The answer to this question 
is no, because consideration of  specifically whose “success” has been barred, save the undifferentiated 
reasonable person. The reasonable person standard has not only not accounted for difference, but in 
 22. Lipsett v. University of  Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, (1st Cir. 1988).
 23. Robert S. Adler and Ellen R. Peirce, "The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of  the "reasonable 
Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases,” Fordham Law Review 61, no. 4 (1993): 775.
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doing this, has also provided a framework in which reflective thought (and therefore pragmatic 
abstraction) is susceptible to the possibility of  practically bringing about “successful,” yet biased and 
unfair results.  
This is problematic because there exists a systemic bias in the reasonable person standard 
that has historically favored men in sexual harassment cases, and has judged in accordance with 
practical “success” of  men. As pointed to in the case of  Ellison v. Brady, Circuit Judge Beezer rejects 
utilizing the reasonable person standard because “we [the court] believe that a sex-blind reasonable 
person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the experiences of  
women.”  Circuit Judge Beezer opts to not not use the reasonable person standard because it does 24
not aptly consider whose “success” it tends toward and whose “success” it ignores. From these 
remarks, it is clear that the “success” of  women has been systemically ignored. Of  course, this is due 
to the standard for judging sexual harassment cases, which up until relatively recently, has been the 
problematically “sex-blind” and concretely male-biased reasonable person standard.  
Pragmatic abstraction, as taken up in reflective thought, though drawn out to a “successful” 
practical result to a problem, has not been carefully used. This is evidenced by the fact it has brought 
about practical consequences that are “successful” to one, yet problematic to another. These 
consequences are problematic because they are concretely unjust and unfair, not to mention biased.  
In terms of  a critical examination of  pragmatic abstraction in the context of  reflective 
thought, this legal example is analogous, as court proceedings for judging a sexual harassment cases 
move in much the same way as pragmatic abstraction for reflective thought. When we initially release 
from present experience, we move from observed present facts of  a problem to what is suggested in 
present experience. In sexual harassment case proceedings, the same happens. Both sides of  the bar 
argue and suggest their favorable potential outcomes for the problem at hand based upon the observed 
and recorded present facts of  the case. Next, by transferring back to present experience, these 
suggestions seek justification via demonstration and inquiry. In other words, the suggestions that 
arose from the observed facts of  the present problem now return back to present experience for 
their confirmation or refutation as practically useful to solve the problem. This is precisely what the 
job of  the judge is, to determine whether suggestions are justified or not by further present facts, 
and from this, to bring about what they think is a “successful” resolution to the problem at hand.  
Using the reasonable person standard for this justificatory step in sexual harassment cases, 
judge’s decisions have drawn from a biased and largely irrelevant set of  present facts, and this is 
concretely problematic, as noted in the Ellison decision. When judges look to a concrete standard 
 24. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, (9th Cir. 1991). 
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for justification that does not acknowledge the difference between men and women and is 
historically male-biased, the resulting decision is “successful,” yet concretely unjust to women. This 
is precisely what I am critical of, as pragmatic abstraction in reflective thought does not necessarily 
consider the question of  whose “success” is resulting. All it has considered heretofore is whether 
“successful” practical consequences are brought about. This consideration, especially for a judge, is 
precarious and usually not particular enough to appropriately address a case’s unique set of  facts. If  
we are presented a case where a woman is bringing a sexual harassment suit, this unqualified 
consideration of  reflective thought is wholly inappropriate, and pragmatic abstraction’s use within 
reflective thought is liable to practical fault. To ameliorate this, we will examine what has largely 
replaced the reasonable person standard in cases of  sexual harassment: the reasonable woman 
standard.  
The reasonable woman standard is a clear concrete example of  how pragmatic abstraction’s 
use for reflective thought can be rendered less practically problematic when whose “success” is 
considered. In the sexual harassment case of  Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., we really see why this 
consideration is essential for concretely fair and just results in court. Rabidue, a female employee at 
an oil refinery, brought a suit against the company alleging that she was “discharged because of  her 
sex” and cited repeated instances of  “vulgar and obscene comments made regularly by her 
supervisor concerning women generally and occasionally the plaintiff  specifically.”  Further, she 25
reported that there were employees who displayed “nude or scantily clad women in their offices and 
in common work areas.”  Understandably, this type of  workplace environment is hostile to 26
Rabidue, as her experience and image as a woman is denigrated when she goes to her job. In this 
case, there is an obvious disconnect between what males think of  as acceptable behavior and what 
females think of  as acceptable behavior. Like in the case of  Lipsett v. University of  Puerto Rico, what a 
male thinks is flattering or harmless may in fact be what a female thinks is insulting and harmful.  
Curiously, the court ruled against Rabidue, stating “the obscenities were ‘not so startling as 
to have affected seriously the psyches of  the plaintiff  or other female employees’” and further 
suggested that “sex-related humor and vulgar jokes abound in certain work environments.”  27
Essentially, the court ruled that given her field of  work, and the fact that “boys will be boys,” 
Rabidue’s case could not prevail. Given this ruling, it is clear what standard the court had used to 
judge this case. It is interesting to ponder whether even a truly undifferentiated person would find 
 25. Adler and Peirce, “Social Implications of  the ‘Reasonable Woman’ Standard,” 791.
  26. Adler and Peirce, “Social Implications of  the ‘Reasonable Woman’ Standard,” 791.
  27. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., a Div. of  Texas-American Petrochemicals, Inc., 805 F.2d 611, (6th Cir. 
1986), quoted in Adler and Peirce, “Social Implications of  the ‘Reasonable Woman’ Standard,” 791.
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this behavior reasonable to tolerate in a work environment, such that it is reasoned not to be a 
hostile work environment. Anyhow, this case clearly exemplifies the effectively male-biased 
undertones of  the reasonable person standard. By concluding via the reasonable person standard 
that in certain work environments this is just the way things are, Rabidue’s practical experience as a 
woman was completely ignored and her “success” was not considered. She was treated as if  her 
experiences were supposed to be the same as a man’s experiences, and in this way, important 
differences between women and men were swept under the rug as if  they did not matter.  
From this case, we see how the reasonable person standard in sexual harassment cases, as the 
standard ruling reflective thought’s justificatory step (which determines what is practically 
“successful” to solve a problem) is concretely problematic. To this point, a dissenting judge in the 
case when it went to an appeals court, Judge Keith, notes that “unless the outlook of  the reasonable 
woman [standard] is adopted, the defendants as well as the courts are permitted to sustain ingrained 
notions of  reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders, in this case, men.”  The “success” 28
Rabidue sought, was opposed to the biased “success” that the reasonable person standard upholds 
and adheres to, and this is precisely why she was ruled against. Ultimately, by judging the case in 
terms of  a reasonable person standard, which justifies the suggestions of  the barristers in terms of  
male-biased practical facts and “success,” Rabidue suffered an unfair and unjust result.  
In contrast, a case where the reasonable woman standard was applied illuminates how the 
consideration of  whose “success” is important when utilizing pragmatic abstraction in reflective 
thought. When we do this, we take into account concrete and interpretive differences, and can 
therefore circumvent “successful,” yet problematically biased practical outcomes. In the hostile work 
environment sexual harassment case of  Ellison v. Brady, practical and interpretive differences of  
present experience (i.e., the differences between the practical experiences of  women and the 
practical experiences of  men) were recognized, and a just and fair ruling resulted from pragmatic 
abstraction’s use in reflective thought. In other words, by considering whose “success” we are 
practically dealing with, in this case the women’s “success,” we primarily and justifiably consider the 
practical facts relevant to a woman’s experience. As seen in Ellison v. Brady, the court more 
appropriately adhered to a woman’s present experience instead of  a man’s present experience and 
therefore judged the practical “success” pertinent to the case’s problem at hand.  
In adopting the reasonable woman standard, the court wisely avoided the reasonable person 
standard’s problematic susceptibility to take on irrelevant practical facts and biases. As Adler and 
Peirce write, “In creating a ‘reasonable woman’ standard, the Ellison court clearly intended to 
 28. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.
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establish aggressive new guidelines for conduct in the workplace rather than adhere to a traditional 
standard that, in its view, simply reinforced prevailing levels of  discrimination.”  From this, a careful, more 29
considerate, and largely unbiased use of  pragmatic abstraction in reflective thought is exemplified by 
the reasonable woman standard. This standard is evidence that pragmatic abstraction, in the 
intimately familiar context of  reflective thought (now reconsidered to take into account whose 
practical “success”), can expand its horizons. Before the consideration of  whose “success” in 
reflective thought, pragmatic abstraction’s use allows for “successful” results for some yet 
problematic practical outcomes for others. This is exemplified in the Rabidue decision where 
injustice and unfairness resulted. After the consideration of  whose “success” in reflective thought, 
pragmatic abstraction’s use largely circumvents this problematic bind. This is exemplified in the 
Ellison decision where justice and fairness resulted.  
VI. Pragmatic Abstraction in Dewey’s Reflective Thought, Reconsidered  
Overall, the Deweyan notion of  reflective thought, that necessarily utilizes the tool of  
pragmatic abstraction, can largely, unproblematically extend beyond its fundamentally individual 
context when whose “success” is considered. By keeping in mind whose “success” we are seeking when 
engaging in reflective thought, the tool of  pragmatic abstraction proves to be less practically 
problematic.  
The critical examination of  pragmatic abstraction within Dewey’s notion of  reflective 
thought is now completed, and his notion of  reflective thought has been reconsidered, rendering 
pragmatic abstraction a less problematic tool to use. To recap, at the outset of  this paper we have 
come to understand how pragmatic abstraction itself  functions, how reflective thought itself  
functions, and what reflective thought’s purpose is. From these initially separate expositions, we then 
moved to looking at these pieces in relation to each other. Specifically, our first examination 
concerned how pragmatic abstraction functions within reflective thought, and our second 
examination concerned what pragmatic abstraction’s purpose is within reflective thought. These 
combinations understood, pragmatic abstraction was critically examined in the latter context. This 
critical examination was the principle task of  this paper, and given its importance, I employed an 
example to supplement it. To this point, I discussed the transition from the reasonable person 
standard to the reasonable woman standard in law, specifically in sexual harassment lawsuits. This 
concrete example is illustrative of  the critical examination done of  pragmatic abstraction within 
reflective thought, as it traced out the problematic practical outcomes of  not taking into 
consideration whose “success” we are bringing about.  
 29. Adler and Peirce, “Social Implications of  the ‘Reasonable Woman’ Standard,” 801. Emphasis added.
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When engaging in reflective thought, the consideration of  whose “success” we are bringing 
about must necessarily be taken into account. As it stands in Dewey’s work How We Think, reflective 
thought necessitates no such consideration, and this has proven concretely problematic. From this, 
the tool of  pragmatic abstraction as used in reflective thought can be (and has been) used to bring 
about “successful,” yet problematic practical results. Always considering whose “success” we are 
practically dealing with, Dewey’s notion of  reflective thought is reconstructed and reconsidered, 
rendering the use of  pragmatic abstraction less problematic than before. 
The tool of  pragmatic abstraction can now be used much more expansively without 
producing concrete problems. We gain the ability to appropriately and carefully solve problems that 
do not directly relate to us and our own practical “success.” This use of  pragmatic abstraction in 
Dewey’s reconsidered notion of  reflective thought thoroughly accounts for differences in present 
experience. Though it seems out of  good intention to see the similarities in everything instead of  
the differences, this view detrimentally ignores important nuances and particularities that are 
essential to appropriately and carefully solve problems. This was exactly why the reasonable person 
standard failed at adequately redressing certain sexual harassment cases. This was exemplified in the 
thinking of  Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., which assumed a bias that effectively posited a woman’s 
experience and reasoning to be the same as a man’s experience and reasoning. This is obviously not 
correct and must be either dismissed, or reconsidered keeping in mind whose “success” is being dealt 
with.  
In sum, we should adopt the reconsidered notion of  reflective thought, as it improves the 
tool of  pragmatic abstraction, and maps more appropriately onto the practical conditions, nuances, 
and problems of  our lives. In this way, we wield a more helpful and expansive tool to utilize in our 
constant daily, hourly, minute to second engagement with Dewey’s (now reconsidered) notion of  
reflective thought.  
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